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Statistical network anomaly 
detection 
Denial of service attack 
a b s t r a c t 
This work describes a novel application of robust estimation to the detection of volumetric 
anomalies in computer network traffic. The proposed tests are based on sample location and 
dispersion and derived from relatively unknown Zero Order Statistics. The proposed tests 
are non-parametric and suitable for a range of applications to heavy-tailed data analysis 
outside of network traffic. 
The performance of these tests is examined using two different real-world denial-of-service 
attacks contained in actual high-volume backbone traffic. The proposed tests outperform 
traditional metrics such as mean and variance due to the presence of heavy tails in the 
network traffic, a frequent characteristic of traffic in actual networks. Monte Carlo analysis 
is used to quantify the performance gains and show an improvement in accuracy between 
7 and 11% at very low false alarm rates. The proposed tests also demonstrate equivalent or 
superior performance to the median, a common robust statistic. 
Constructive timing of key system processes is used to demonstrate near real-time perfor- 
mance. Three- and six- second data windows containing between 750 and 1200 elements 
can be processed in less than one second using commodity hardware running unoptimized 
code. These timing results imply scalability to a variety of networks and commercial ap- 
plications. Scalability prospects are further enhanced by demonstrating resilient detection 
performance at attack volumes between 25 and 100 percent of baseline rates in both real 
and generated traffic. 









Assumptions of Gaussianity are implicit in many statistical
measurements and analyses, sometimes when not supported
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Floyd, 1995; Simmross-Wattenberg et al., 2008; Willinger et al.,
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Non-Gaussian statistics should logically be more ap-
propriate for measuring and detecting anomalies in theseor Telecommunications Sciences under various proposals, US Air 
gram under Proposal NPS-19-N039A. The sponsors played no role 










































































































raffic features. Supporting this assertion, numerous signal 
rocessing fields (e.g., underwater, radar, image, and wireless) 
ave an extended history of improving estimation and de- 
ection accuracy through applying heavy-tailed tests in ap- 
ropriate environments ( El Ghannudi et al., 2010; Sadreazami 
t al., 2014; Tsakalides and Nikias, 1998; Tsakalides et al., 2000; 
sihrintzis, 1998 ). 
In the late 2000s, two different research groups demon- 
trated that non-Gaussian distributions more accurately 
odel the marginal distributions of many network traffic fea- 
ures. They proposed two different distributional traffic mod- 
ls: gamma and α-stable ( Scherrer et al., 2007; Simmross- 
attenberg et al., 2008 ). These two research groups also used 
heir non-Gaussian approach to develop off-line parametric 
etectors improved overall detection accuracy over equivalent 
aussian approaches (e.g., mean and variance). The paramet- 
ic, α-stable -based approach was ultimately shown to be more 
ccurate ( Simmross-Wattenberg et al., 2011 ). 
Existing α-stable parametric methods are computationally 
ostly, however, and require off-line processing or training 
imes on the order of minutes or hours ( Hosseinzadeh et al.,
020; Simmross-Wattenberg et al., 2011 ). The a priori assump- 
ion of distribution in parametric tests can also lead to signif- 
cant accuracy degradation should inputs differ from distri- 
utional assumptions. Our prior work has shown that while 
raffic is frequently α-stable , its distribution can vary based 
n factors such as background network activity, size, and de- 
ice composition ( Bollmann et al., 2018; Gonzalez et al., 2019 ).
Accordingly, this work proposes and evaluates less-costly,
eavy-tailed tests suitable for detecting volumetric network 
raffic anomalies (i.e., distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) at- 
acks) in real time. The proposed tests are non-parametric 
o provide resilient accuracy despite the inherent diversity of 
etworks and traffics. The hypothesis examined herein is that 
eavy-tailed tests will outperform other nonparametric tests 
n a network traffic context and that they can operate in real 
ime. 
The contributions of this work are as follows: We adapt 
ero-order statistics (ZOS) to develop heavy-tailed tests ap- 
ropriate for a new application, network anomaly detection.
onstructive timing analysis is used to show that these tests 
an be applied in near-real time (on the order of a second 
or a 1000-sample data window). For the first time in net- 
ork anomaly detection, we demonstrate that applying these 
eavy-tailed tests produces better outcomes than Gaussian- 
nd rank-based tests in terms of both area under the curve 
AUC) and false-positive rate (FPR). Finally, at low FPRs ( ≈ 1 –
%) in publicly-available datasets, we confirm a performance 
mprovement of 4–14% and 1–15% over equivalent Gaussian 
nd robust methods, respectively. This performance improve- 
ent is shown to be consistent across different datasets and 
or real and generated traffic scenarios, showing that the pro- 
osed tests perform as expected even in less prescriptive sce- 
arios. 
Our work examines the use case of computer network traf- 
c in.pcap format from the monitoring and analysis of the 
IDE internet (MAWI) archive, but we emphasize that these 
ethods are extensible to any heavy-tailed data. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The 
pplication context including applicable prior work, the re- earch problem, analysis methodology, and analyzed datasets 
s discussed in Section 2 . Section 3 provides technical context 
egarding the α-stable distribution, ZOS, and our developed 
est statistics. Section 4 evaluates the α-stable methodology,
resenting accuracy and timing results. Conclusions and Fu- 
ure Work are contained in Section 5 . 
. Background 
his work lies at the intersection of many fields including 
etwork anomaly detection, nonparametric estimation, and 
eavy-tailed statistics. As such, we will review only the se- 
ected prior work we believe to be most applicable to the pro- 
osed system. 
Statistical anomaly detection has progressed from regres- 
ion and adaptive thresholds per Thottan and Ji (2003) to non- 
arametric cumulative-sum (CUSUM) algorithms ( Siris and 
apagalou, 2006 ) to advanced parametric approaches using 
ixture models that capture complex distributions of fea- 
ures ( Camacho et al., 2016; Kuruoglu et al., 1998; Scherrer 
t al., 2007 ). As this work is “statistical-based” per Garcia- 
eodoro et al. (2009) , we will focus primarily on non-machine 
earning approaches that use non-Gaussian tests. 
.1. Heavy-tailed or robust work 
here has been increased recent interest in examining 
on-Gaussian statistical measures and detection systems 
nd measures. These techniques get to the “strong sta- 
istical foundation” of Siris and Papagalou (2006) , as prior 
ork has shown aspects of network traffic to be frequently 
on-Gaussian. Heavy-tailed features were identified in the 
id-1990s ( Crovella and Bestavros, 1997; Paxson and Floyd,
995 ); non-Gaussian detection systems were developed in the 
ate 2000s based on the gamma and α-stable distributions 
 Scherrer et al., 2007; Simmross-Wattenberg et al., 2011 ). 
Our own work (published and in-process) has confirmed 
hat the α-stable distribution frequently provides a closer fit 
nd model of traffic on many networks ( Bollmann, 2018; Boll- 
ann et al., 2018 ; ( Safar et al., 2020 )). Additionally, per renewal
heory, the α-stable distribution has theoretical support as the 
imiting distribution for aggregations of device traffic in larger,
ore diverse networks ( Gonzalez et al., 2019; Willinger et al.,
998 ). 
Most recently, Hosseinzadeh et al. (2020) propose a hybrid 
amma-Gaussian model and parametric detection system as 
n α-stable alternative. Their use of a mixture model is intrigu- 
ng because of its ability to accurately model bi-modal distri- 
utions; this characteristic is commonly observed at the start 
nd stop of an attack as shown in Fig. 1 . They evaluate their
etection system by training for periods of time between 86 
nd 6917 s on a variety of injected attacks at varying inten- 
ity. When comparing the performance of their parametric ap- 
roach to Simmross–Wattenberg’s method, they find that the 
amma-Gaussian method improves overall fit and detection 
erformance. 
Similar to the median, the α-stable distribution is a ro- 
ust statistic because its heavy tail makes it resistant to 
c o m p u t e r s  &  s e c u r i t y  1 0 2  ( 2 0 2 1 )  1 0 2 1 4 6  3 
Fig. 1 – Histogram of packet counts over 4 s at the onset of a 
DDoS attack in the 151114 MAWI trace. The attack traffic 















































































skewing due to data outliers. Recent network anomaly de-
tection work has confirmed that detector accuracy can be
improved by using robust statistics instead of Gaussian mea-
sures such as mean and variance. Most recently, Elkhadir and
Mohammed (2019) improve the performance of a linear dis-
criminant analysis-based detection system against attacks in
KDD datasets by replacing a mean-based metric with a robust
statistic. 
2.2. Nonparametric estimation and anomaly detection 
While parametric approaches are optimal when the data dis-
tribution is known and assured, estimators that do not make a
priori assumptions are known to be more accurate when data
distributions vary, are unknown, or do not fit any particular
distribution. Our own work has found that while heteroge-
neous backbone traffic frequently follows an α-stable distri-
bution, a network’s device composition and activity profiles
can lead to non-Gaussian or non- α-stable traffic such as in the
case of attack transitions (e.g., Fig. 1 ), cyber competitions or
small, homogeneous networks ( Bollmann et al., 2018; Gonza-
lez et al., 2019 ). 
Nonparametric approaches avoid potentially significant er-
rors due to distribution-assumption mismatch. This makes
them more flexible overall in the context of general applica-
tion across varying networks and traffic conditions as well
as in data other than typical TCP/IP network traffic. For in-
stance, G.S. and Balakrishnan (2019) use the non-parametric
Chi-square test to detect divergent CPU utilization profiles in-
dicative of cyber attacks. 
Nonparametric solutions can also leverage improved com-
putational tractability to provide more responsive solu-
tions, particularly in multivariate systems ( Hero, 2007 ). This
has been recent growing interest in nonparametric sta-
tistical approaches to support the higher computational
costs of machine learning solutions ( Alhakami et al., 2019 ).
Kurt et al. (2020) use nonparametric geometric entropy min-imization and CUSUM tests to identify anomalies in internet-
of-thing data streams considering sets of 115 features. 
Most similar to our approach, Callegari et al. (2017) used
nonparametric, entropy-based tests to classify attacks in a
MAWI dataset. We use similar datasets and evaluation mea-
sures such as area under the curve (AUC). However, we con-
sider only univariate data, develop different, robust non-
parametric tests, and operate in real time. Also, though not
directly applicable because different datasets were used, the
AUCs for our baseline cases appear to be greater, with higher
accuracy at equivalent false alarm rates. Note that it was not
possible to make a direct comparison of the proposed system
to the results in Callegari et al. (2017) as the data was not spec-
ified. 
2.3. Research problem and methodology 
The hypothesis examined by this work is that due to the
heavy-tailed nature of network traffic, simple heavy-tailed (or
robust) statistical tests can enable more accurate detection.
Further, this simple statistical approach can be developed to
enable real-time operation while maintaining high accuracy
at low false-positive rates. 
Given the above, we propose applying heavy-tailed (i.e., ro-
bust) tests and examining the tests in a network traffic use
case. These estimators and tests must first be identified and
developed, then their performance can be compared to Gaus-
sian estimators. While the proposed system is univariate, we
develop two independent tests that should allow us to move
towards a multivariate approach in the future. 
The proposed algorithms are examined for scalability and
found to operate in constructed real-time on relatively high
speed datasets ( ≈ 1 Gbps) using small data windows on the
order of 3–6 s. Finally, the algorithms are tested on real-world
attacks natively present in the MAWI archive ( Fontugne et al.,
2010 ). The examined datasets are the next topic of discus-
sion in this section, while the developed test statistics are dis-
cussed in Section 3.1 . 
To maximize the applicability of the results, we evaluate
performance using modern datasets consisting of real-world
attacks in actual backbone network traffic for two different at-
tack intensities. We further stress the proposed systems by
adding noise to the data through generating traffic records
from actual measurements and again compare performance. 
As the objective of our research is investigating detection of
volumetric DDoS attacks, this work only examines the feature
of number of packets per subwindow and the test statistics
are developed accordingly. 
Our work does not use specific information in packet head-
ers, so the proposed techniques are layer-agnostic in terms of
detecting a specific attack ( Davis and Clark, 2011 ). Further, we
note that port scans, which some works classify port scans as
the most frequent type of attack ( Molina et al., 2012 ), should
also cause a traffic volume increase that could be detected by
the proposed system. 
We believe that the methods in this research are extensi-
ble to other network traffic features that deviate during an
attack and natively possess heavy tails (as well as suitably-
distributed data in other fields). 
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Fig. 2 – Plot of total packet rate (black) and attack packet rate (red), in packets per subwindow, for a portion of the MAWI 
160428 trace. The attack begins approximately 510s into the trace. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure 
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.) 





































.4. Datasets: the MAWI archive 
his work utilizes two datasets containing anomalies that for 
ur purposes will be termed attacks . We selected traces con- 
aining both large and small attacks to stress our proposed 
ystem. 
We chose to examine volumetric DDoS attacks because 
hese attacks remain quite common and continue to concern 
etwork operators ( Molina et al., 2012 ). We chose to exam- 
ne backbone traffic containing native attacks to demonstrate 
he system’s potential utility for mitigating and filtering DDoS 
ttacks closer to the source ( Molina et al., 2012 ). The low- 
olume attack occurred on 28 April 2016. The onset of this at- 
ack is shown in Fig. 2 . The high-volume attack occurred on 14 
ovember 2015. Portions of the trace used for our dataset are 
hown in Fig. 3 . 
These anomalies were forensically examined using Wire- 
hark® to verify that their properties (i.e., address concen- 
ration, volume, packet size, flags) were typical of volumet- 
ic TCP DDoS flooding attacks. These traces were collected,nonymized, and made available by the MAWI archive, a pub- 
ic dataset composed of 15-minute, near-daily .pcap records 
f all traffic passing across a trans-Pacific backbone link be- 
ween the United States and Japan ( Fontugne et al., 2010 ). The
races are anonymized and truncated in a manner that pre- 
erves the distribution of internet protocol (IP) addresses to 
ermit analysis and classification of the traffic using common 
raffic features. Note that the integrated MAWI anomaly de- 
ection algorithms also flagged the trace portions selected for 
ur datasets as anomalous ( Combs et al., 1998; Fontugne et al.,
010 ). 
The low- and high-volume trace portions used in our anal- 
sis will be referred to as the 160428 and 151114 datasets,
espectively. Both traces were selected because the anomaly 
eriods were distinct and of sufficient duration to provide 
arge subsets of “normal” (i.e., benign) and attack data. The 
ge of the attacks was deemed to be irrelevant because 
olumetric denial-of-service attacks continue to be one of 
he most frequent and highly-concerning types of attacks 
Verizon) . 



















































Table 1 – Summary of analysis parameters and number 
of cases for examined scenarios. 
MAWI trace L  sw o N A N B 
160428 750 3 4 5/6 767 1031 
151114 750 3 4 11/12 1281 895 





























Note that the high-volume 151114 trace was the first
trace chosen and analyzed in the course of the study. This
high-volume case initially served as a proof-of-concept. Once
the system design and core arguments were validated, the
authors sought and identified a low-volume attack (160428)
to challenge the proposed methodology. Also note that the
datasets created as part of this work are available at the cor-
responding author’s git repository. 
2.4.1. Low-volume attack scenario – the 160428 trace 
The 160428 dataset contains a lower-volume, attack that
varies a-periodically between approximately 15–25% of benign
background traffic volume. A portion of the 160428 trace is
shown in Fig. 2 . The total traffic, in packets per subwindow,
is plotted in black, while the attack traffic is shown in red. 
As the attack started nearly halfway through the trace and
persisted to the end of the MAWI collection period, segregating
the attack and benign samples was straightforward. Periods of
the trace without the anomalous, high-volume flow were pro-
cessed and labeled as “benign” samples while portions with
the high-volume flow were labeled as “attack” samples. The
benign samples of the 160428 trace were obtained from the
trace portions between 30 and 480 s (from the start of the
trace), while the attack samples were obtained between 510
and 900 s. The 30 s buffer between attack and benign portions
was chosen to allow the “ramping” volume of the attack to
fully manifest. The high volume attack, discussed in the next
section, required only a six second buffer to segregate attack
and benign traffic as the ramp time was virtually nonexistent.
This trace was specifically selected as a challenge to our
proposed detection system; many network anomaly detection
studies examine their proposed system’s performance against
DDoS attacks with greater magnitudes (i.e., 25 − 100+ % of be-
nign background traffic) ( Ma and Chen, 2014; Scherrer et al.,
2007; Simmross-Wattenberg et al., 2011; Wu et al., 2016 ). By
remaining at or below the lower-end of this magnitude spec-
trum, the performance of our proposed system can be as-
sumed to relevant. 
The 160428 trace was processed at two different sampling
settings to isolate any performance effects due to processing
vice test suitability. These settings are further discussed in
Section 2.5 and their impacts analyzed in Section 4.4 
2.4.2. High-volume attack scenario – the 151114 trace 
The 151114 dataset contains a high-volume, ON-OFF attack at
approximately 90% of the benign background traffic volume.
A portion of the trace is shown in Fig. 3 . Similar to the 160428
trace, the total traffic, in packets per subwindow, is plotted in
black. In this dataset the attack traffic originates from multi-
ple sources so its contribution to the total traffic is not shown
separately. 
Obtaining a sufficient benign population from this trace
was more complicated because the attack begins soon into
the collection period. Numerous samples had to be extracted
from the OFF periods of the attack and manually examined
to ensure that the data window contained approximately 10%
or fewer attack subwindows; this was determined to be an
acceptable threshold because traffic samples during “benign”
conditions can often contain high-volume outliers due to rou-
tine background processes (i.e., packet storms). Attack sam-ples were similarly screened to ensure they contained less
than 10% benign subwindows. 
2.5. Dataset creation 
The overall populations of attack N A and benign samples N B
that are available as inputs to our detection system are deter-
mined by the data processing settings of window  , subwin-
dow sw , and overlap o . 
Throughout this work we use the term sample to denote a
series of subwindowed counting periods sw , where typically
sw = 4 or 5 ms. Window  is the total length of the sample
(in units of s). Subwindow sw and window  are related by
the total number of counting periods L according to 
L =  / sw , (1)
where 
 = [ t stop − t start ] , (2)
and t start and t stop are the start and stop times of the data pro-
cessing window, in s, respectively. 
One other factor, o , affects the number of windows
(or samples) obtainable from a trace. Overlap is simply the
amount of a given sample that is contained in the subsequent
sample, and can be defined as 
o = 
t start (i +1) − t start i 
 
, (3)
for arbitrary i . 
To identify any accuracy impacts from changing system
settings that affect the extent of data aggregation, the 160,428
trace was processed using two different groups of settings
(  = 3 s / sw = 4 ms and  = 6 s / sw = 5 ms); these set-
tings and the resulting sample populations L for are given in
Table 1 . 
3. Heavy-tailed statistics and tests 
Given this background on applicable prior non-Gaussian net-
work anomaly detection and our examined datasets, let us
now review essential technical topics including zero-order
statistics (ZOS), a family of estimators developed to measure
α-stable signals, and the specific tests developed for our de-
tection system. Subject matter constraints prevent discus-
sion of the properties and nuances of the α-stable distribu-
tion; the interested reader is referred to the cited authoritative































































































eferences, particularly Nolan (2018) and Samorodnitsky and 
aqqu (1994) . 
One of the motivations for this work was to investigate 
he cost savings of using non-parametric (but α-stable - 
uitable) methods vice traditional parametric models. Prior 
arametric approaches have repeatedly sought to harness 
-stable capabilities through approximation methods such 
s replicating α-stable distribution characteristics through 
ixtures of distributions such as Kuruoglu et al. (1998) and 
osseinzadeh et al. (2020) . These approaches use symmet- 
ic distributions to approximate well-known characteristics of 
etwork traffic such as its asymmetry and heavy tail. Sim- 
larly, this lack of traffic feature symmetry prevents the use 
f FLOS due to its reliance on a symmetric kernel ( Kuruoglu,
001; Tsihrintzis, 1998 ). 
.1. Zero-order statistics 
he family of ZOS does not apply assumptions inappropri- 
te for network traffic measurement. Gonzalez et al. devel- 
ped ZOS in the late 1990s to provide α-stable equivalents 
f the Gaussian-based metrics of mean λ2 and variance σ 2 2 
 Gonzalez et al., 2006 ). This is necessary due to the α-stable mo-
ent order constraint , that moments of order p exist only for 
p < α ( Samorodnitsky and Taqqu, 1994 ). As such, the variance 
f α-stable RV Z is undefined when αZ < 2 . For highly impulsive 
ata where α < 1 , the mean (when p = 1 ) is also undefined.
ccordingly, the Gaussian-derived measures of power and σ 2 2 
and, depending on α, mean) do not exist for α-stable RVs and,
s such, must be alternately defined. 
We use ZOS in our work because they are derived using 
eavy-tailed assumptions and avoid the approximations and 
igher computational costs required by using FLOS and mix- 
ures. In addition to being robust to outliers, ZOS do not as- 
ume a distribution a priori and our analysis has shown them 
o produce reasonable approximations in a range of different 
raffic conditions and attack scenarios, including during at- 
ack transitions where data windows contain a mixture of at- 
ack and benign traffic. 
.1.1. Zero-order location (ZOL) 
he ZOL λ0 provides an estimate of the location of a data sam- 
le, similar in principle to mean λ2 , and it is nonparametric 
n the sense that it does not estimate the location through 
 likelihood-based fit of an assumed distribution to the data 
 Gonzalez et al., 2006 ). The result is not necessarily equal to 
he α-stable parameter μ of an α-stable ML fit of the sample,
hough our observation is that the zero-order location (ZOL) 
sually takes a value similar to both μ and the mode of an 
-stable distributed sample. 
For random process Z, a sample’s ZOL ( Gonzalez et al., 2006 ) 
s defined as 
0 = arg min 
λ
E ln | Z − λ| . (4) 
For a sample composed of L elements z i , (4) can be dis- 
retized and simplified to 
 0 = arg min 
z j ∈ ξ
L ∑ 
i =1 ,z i  = z j 
ln | z i − z j | , (5) or i ∈ (0 , j] and where ξ is the set of repeated values in a
iven observation of Z ( Gonzalez et al., 2006 ). The proof of
his derivation is not essential to this work but is available 
 Gonzalez et al., 2006 ). 
Note that (5) permits estimation of λ0 directly from data 
nd without having to compute estimates for all possible val- 
es of location, reducing computational costs. ZOL has one 
rawback in that (5) will mis-estimate small data sets where 
nly outlying values are repeated ( Gonzalez, 1997 ). 
In our experiences to date, where samples generally 
ave had a well-defined mode, fairly compact range, and a 
ufficiently-large number of elements (on the order of 750 −
000+ ), this potential mis-behavior of ZOL has not been of 
oncern. 
.1.2. Zero-order dispersion (ZOD) 
he ZOS equivalent of the spread, or variance, of a sample is 
iven by ZOD. Little practical application of ZOD exists in the 
iterature. We have found, though, that zero-order dispersion 
ZOD) is a useful measure of the spread of α-stable data, par- 
icularly because it can also be estimated without incurring 
he full costs of a four-parameter α-stable fit. 
Mathematically, ZOD δ0 is defined similarly to variance σ 2 , 
he deviation of a sample from the Gaussian mean λ2 , where 
2 (Z ) = E (Z − λ2 ) 2 . (6) 
To specify ZOD, we use the ZOS statistics of geomet- 
ic power ϕ(·) and ˆ λ0 vice second-order power E (·) 2 and λ2 
 Gonzalez et al., 2006 ). Substituting accordingly into (6) gives 
OD as 
ˆ 0 (Z ) = ϕ 0 
(∣∣∣Z − ˆ λ0 ∣∣∣), (7) 
here ϕ(·) is equivalent to the geometric mean 
 Gonzalez et al., 2006 ). Thus, for a sample of Z, (7) can be
iscretized and reformulated ( Gonzalez et al., 2006 ) as 
ˆ 0 (Z ) = 
( L ∏ 
i =1 
∣∣∣z i − ˆ λ0 ∣∣∣
) 
1 
L . (8) 
he full derivation is again beyond the scope of this work but 
s available in the references ( Gonzalez, 1997; Gonzalez et al.,
006 ). Note that z i with a value equal to 0 must be excluded
hen applying (8) in order to obtain a usable result. 
The ZOS of (5) and (8) are ML estimators, but avoid most 
f the computational costs of a parametric approach using α- 
table methods. The costs of α-stable ML fits are a possible rea- 
on for the limited application of α-stable models and meth- 
ds in many fields ( Nolan, 2018 ). 
The efficiency of the applied estimators is quantified in 
able 2 , which compares the computational cost t est in μs of 
andidate estimators, averaged over 10,000 trials on our sys- 
em. Hardware and software details regarding our test system 
re contained in Appendix A . The costs in Table 2 are given for
wo sample sizes L used to produce the results of this work.
he notable implication of these results is that while ZOL and 
OD are not as “cheap” as non-ML statistics such as mean,
hey are more than 50x cheaper than a full, four-parameter fit 
f the data. 
c o m p u t e r s  &  s e c u r i t y  1 0 2  ( 2 0 2 1 )  1 0 2 1 4 6  7 
Table 2 – Computational cost in μs of estimators when 
processing a given sample size. 
Elements Mean ZOL ZOD ML Stable 
L λ2 ˆ λ0 ˆ δ0 Fit 
750 11 714 726 45,308 
1200 11 1784 1793 59,212 
Fig. 4 – Simplified anomaly detection implementation used 































































3.2. Test development 
With candidate real-time statistics identified, the next tasks
become building appropriate α-stable anomaly tests and a
framework for applying these tests to the chosen datasets. The
proposed framework is shown in Fig. 4 , where a generalized
likelihood ratio test (GLRT) 
(·) is used to compare the ZOS
ML estimate ( ̂ λ0 , for this example) of the current sample ˆ λ0 ,t 
to the benign, prior reference sample ̂  λ0 ,re f . The resulting GLRT
score is compared to a system-specified threshold τ, derived
in Appendix C . An attack is declared in the case of 
(·) ≥ τ . 
A typical parametric GLRT applies the test 

( d t ) = p ( d t ;H 1 ) p( d t ;H 0 ) 
≷ τ, (9)
where d t is the sample currently being examined ( Kay, 1998 ),
but this approach requires a priori assumptions regarding the
distributions of d t under the benign case H 0 as well as the at-
tack case H 1 . 
To remove the increased potential for error due to incor-
rect assumptions regarding data distribution, and to avoid
the costs of a full α-stable fit and likelihood calculation, we
can replace the more costly tests of (9) with the previously-
developed ZOS estimators. Thus, the ZOL version of the test
statistic in (9) becomes 

( d t ) = 
ˆ λ0 , t ( d t ) 
ˆ λ0 , re f 
(
d re f 
) ≷ τ. (10)
This non-parametric test compares the location estimate
of the current sample d t to the estimate of a prior, reference
sample d re f . Note that (10) can be adapted to create other test
statistics (e.g., mean, median, variance) by substituting the ap-
propriate function for ̂  λ0 (·) . 3.3. Test adaptations 
In some cases, the performance of test statistics can be im-
proved by differencing the current sample and a previous
sample. Differencing is a data transformation technique fre-
quently applied in time-series analysis to mitigate the ef-
fects of non-stationary trends or random walks in the data
( Aggarwal, 2013 ). In our application the latter is the con-
cern; we assume data stationarity because the length of our
attack and benign trace segments is significantly less than
thresholds (e.g., 30 min) used in relevant literature ( Simmross-
Wattenberg et al., 2011 ). 
Random walks are a concern because the windows used in
this work are substantially smaller than those used in simi-
lar works (e.g., 3–6 s vice multiple minutes) and potentially on
the order of network background processes ( Gonzalez et al.,
2019; Scherrer et al., 2007; Simmross-Wattenberg et al., 2011 ).
An additional empirical motivation for differencing is the ef-
fect of DDoS attacks on the traffic histogram; the attack traffic
frequently increases the packet count per subwindow as com-
pared to the benign prior case, causing an increase in sample
spread. Differencing d t and d re f more sharply reveals the in-
creased attack traffic. 
An example of this effect, and the impact of differencing,
is shown in Fig. 5 . This figure, generated by comparing two
attack and three benign samples randomly chosen from the
160428 trace, shows how differencing eliminates similar mea-
surements between samples and emphasizes the outlying at-
tack traffic. 
With differencing, the location-based estimate of differ-
enced ZOL, or dZOL, takes the form of 
ˆ λ0 ( d t ) = ̂  λ0 
(
d t − d re f 
)
. (11)
The performance of the ZOD statistic (8) can be similarly
improved against DDoS attacks through referencing the ZOL
of the benign prior window ˆ λ0 ,re f . The resulting spread test
statistic, rZOD, becomes 
ˆ δ0 ( d t ) = ˆ φ0 ,t 
⎛ 
⎝ L ∏ 
i =1 




The results of applying the test statistics of (11) and (12) to
the selected MAWI datasets validate the central hypothesis
of this work, that simple, heavy-tailed nonparametric detec-
tion methods outperform Gaussian methods when applied to
network traffic. Interestingly, the derived nonparametric tests
also outperform the median as a test statistic, providing fur-
ther empirical support for the α-stable (and heavy-tailed) na-
ture of backbone network traffic. 
The high-volume 151114 trace is analyzed first to validate
the proposed system. 
Subsequent analysis of the low-volume 160428 results will
reveal any performance changes due to lower attack magni-
tudes or variation in traffic (and distribution) due to changes
over time. 
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Fig. 6 – ROC comparison of α-stable and classical estimators 
for the 151114 high-volume attack trace using real data; the 













t  System effectiveness at lower attack volumes is signifi- 
ant for several reasons. Systems that are effective against 
ow-volume attacks could provide protection against stealthy 
ttacks that are designed to evade typical thresholds. Low- 
olume detection systems should also enable faster detec- 
ion and mitigation of high-volume attacks while they are still 
amping up. 
.1. Evaluation methodology 
o evaluate our non-parametric tests, we used a 50,000-trial 
onte Carlo analysis that compared randomly-selected attack 
nd benign samples from the populations in Table 1 . When a 
ifferenced sample was required, the algorithm selected a ran- 
om reference case from the benign population. This use of a 
andom reference tends to slightly reduce the effectiveness of 
he differencing due to random walks of traffic. However, we 
elieve this conservative approach increases the general ap- 
licability of our results. This choice is also more reflective of 
eal-life, as practical implementations will utilize windowing 
chemes with varying amounts of overlap. 
The results of the Monte Carlo analysis are presented using 
eceiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves, or ROCs. The 
OCs for classical estimators (e.g., median, mean, and vari- 
nce) were determined using native MATLAB® functions ap- 
lied to the same types of data windows (e.g., differenced or 
on-differenced) as our non-parametric tests ( MATLAB, 2017 ).
or instance, the mean ROC was calculated as mean 
(
d t − d re f 
)
.
ROCs can be used to evaluate the tradeoff between true 
ositive rate P d false positive rate P fa for a given test statistic 
ver various values of τ ( Bhuyan et al., 2014 ). The true positive 
ate is defined as 




here n tp is the number of attack samples properly classified 
 Bhuyan et al., 2014 ). Similarly, the false-positive rate is defined by 
 fa = 
n f p 
N B 
, (14) 
here n f p is the number of misclassified benign samples 
 Bhuyan et al., 2014 ). 
.2. High-volume attack results 
he test comparison ROC for the high volume attack scenario 
i.e., the 151114 trace) is shown for Fig. 6 . For all ROCs, the per-
ormance of α-stable estimators is shown using solid lines.
ote that the ROCs in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 were obtained using col-
ected samples with a size L = 750 ; only portions of the ROCs
re shown to facilitate performance comparisons at low P fa . 
We focus our analysis on the upper-left portion of the 
urves (and the correspondingly-low P fa ), as this is the 
ractical area of operation for statistical network anomaly de- 
ectors ( Axelsson, 2000 ). For such a high volume of attack (e.g.,
c o m p u t e r s  &  s e c u r i t y  1 0 2  ( 2 0 2 1 )  1 0 2 1 4 6  9 
Fig. 7 – ROC comparison of α-stable and classical estimators for the 160,428 trace using real data. The range of both P d and 
P fa are much larger than that of Fig. 6 to facilitate a broader assessment of performance. 
Table 3 – ROC results summary of high- and low-volume 
attack scenarios. 
Real data Generated data 
P d P fa AUC P d P fa AUC 
151114 dZOL 0.990 0.005 0.999 0.998 0.005 1.000 
rZOD 0.999 0.001 1.000 1.000 0.005 1.000 
median 0.995 0.005 0.999 0.998 0.005 1.000 
mean 0.998 0.005 1.000 0.986 0.005 0.994 
VAR 0.126 0.001 0.165 0.020 0.005 0.132 
160428 dZOL 0.869 0.04 0.980 0.933 0.04 0.964 
L = 750 rZOD 0.679 0.04 0.959 0.927 0.04 0.973 
median 0.819 0.04 0.954 0.924 0.04 0.964 
mean 0.773 0.04 0.947 0.864 0.04 0.955 
VAR 0.517 0.04 0.887 0.028 0.04 0.718 
160428 dZOL 0.944 0.01 0.989 0.940 0.01 0.990 
L = 1200 rZOD 0.876 0.01 0.988 0.972 0.01 0.994 
median 0.869 0.01 0.983 0.928 0.01 0.990 
mean 0.834 0.01 0.980 0.842 0.01 0.982 













































approximately 100 percent of background traffic), all estima-
tors perform relatively well with the exception of variance.
The VAR ROC falls entirely off the plot but a summary eval-
uation is available in Table 3 . 
For the 151114 case, the non-parametric estimator rZOD
performs best. dZOL, however, is outperformed by its classical
equivalent of mean λ2 . We attribute this result to the volume
of attack traffic, which is so high in this scenario that the re-
sultant traffic histogram frequently has a near-Gaussian dis-
tribution (e.g., 1065 out of 1280 samples have empirically near-
Gaussian parameter values where α → 2 ). As λ2 is the optimal
location estimator for Gaussian data ( Gonzalez et al., 2006 ),
dZOL should be at a theoretical disadvantage. This belief is re-
inforced by the fact that the mean also outperforms the me-
dian, a proven robust alternative. An equally-interesting (i.e.,
silver lining) observation is that, because of their nonparamet-
ric basis and flexible nature, the dZOL and rZOD perform well
even during such “adverse” conditions. The 151114 results validate the concept and resilience of
the proposed approach, but the gains from the proposed im-
plementation are somewhat inconsistent and low-magnitude.
Let us now examine the low-volume 160428 results to make a
more compelling argument for a heavy-tailed methodology. 
4.3. Low-volume attack results 
The 160428 trace, with an attack volume between 15 and 25%
of benign traffic volume, was selected as the challenging sce-
nario for our system. It is with these results, shown in Fig. 7 ,
that the performance advantages of the proposed tests be-
come notable. For P fa ∈ [0 . 02 , 0 . 08] , the α-stable location esti-
mator dZOL improves P d by 4.5–14% over the mean and again
outperforms the median, frequently by 3–5%. As expected, the
median performs better than the mean in this scenario. 
The spread estimator rZOD is typically more accurate
than variance by 15% in the displayed range (i.e., for P fa ∈
[0 . 03 , 0 . 14] ) and more accurate than all examined estimators
at high false alarm rates. This suggests potential for improv-
ing overall performance through a multivariate approach (an
item of future work). 
4.4. Stressing the proposed system 
An additional evaluation measure, useful as a single-value
comparison between test statistics, is the area under the curve
(AUC). The AUC is determined by integrating the ROC for a
given scenario. Presenting detection results as AUCs permits
concisely summarizing and comparing the results of a large
number of scenarios. 
To more broadly assess the proposed system, we extended
our data archive by generating additional datasets from each
real-world sample. The generated cases use the ML-estimated
α-stable fits to collected samples to probabilistically gener-
ate equivalent populations of attack and benign samples.
These generated samples are then evaluated by the detection
system using the same methodology (e.g., same test statistics
and Monte Carlo analysis). 






















































Table 4 – Computational cost in μs of major detection pro- 
cess steps for a given sample size. 
L  t win t ing t est t det t̄ d t̄ tot 
750 3 s 690,690 713 726 1 1440 692,130 















































Data generation effectively increases the size of our sample 
ool with the intention of identifying any performance artifi- 
ialities that may result from using time-limited (and, hence,
ample-limited) MAWI traces. The heavy tail of the stable dis- 
ribution leads to significant variation in samples, even be- 
ween samples generated from the same parameters. Expand- 
ng the datasets in this way should reduce the impacts of any 
verfitting or artifacts in the collected data ( Ring et al., 2019 ),
ffectively adding noise and evaluating the resilience of the 
roposed system. 
Table 3 presents the AUC results for the six analyzed cases.
hese cases were produced by analyzing both collected and 
enerated data from the three different real-world datasets: 
he 151114 trace and the two window sizes of the 160428 trace 
 L = { 750 , 1200 } ). 
.5. Accuracy summary for all examined cases 
verall, the results for all cases show that, for real data, the 
roposed estimators enable more accurate detection of vol- 
metric anomalies in network traffic at desirably-low P fa , 
s compared to traditional tests (i.e., Gaussian statistics as 
ell as the median). Analysis of the additional results in 
able 3 shows that these gains are consistent across the range 
f examined cases. When comparing the performance differ- 
nces between the six cases, it is important to consider the 
ollowing notes regarding all presented results. The AUC anal- 
sis in Table 3 used non-differenced results for the dispersion 
stimators rZOD and VAR, while dZOL refers specifically to dif- 
erenced ZOL as given by (11) . 
The most significant result from comparison of the cases 
n Table 3 is the consistent and accurate performance, across 
ll 6 cases, of the proposed test statistics, as measured by 
oth AUC and P d . When comparing between peers (i.e., loca- 
ion and dispersion), the proposed estimators provide equiv- 
lent or superior performance in 11 of 12 cases. rZOD signifi- 
antly outperforms VAR in all scenarios. The real 151,114 sce- 
ario is the only case where traditional estimators outperform 
ZOL (likely due to the previously-discussed Gaussian trends 
n high-volume attack traffic). dZOL shines in the low volume 
ttack scenarios, however, providing gains of 7–11% over mean 
nd 1–8% over the alternative robust statistic of median. 
The most significant drawback of the proposed estimators 
ppears to be the relatively inconsistent performance of rZOD 
t very low P fa . While rZOD has the best performance by AUC 
nd P d in both cases of the high-volume attack at an extremely 
ow P fa = 0 . 1% , in the low volume scenarios it only demon-
trates the highest P d at higher values of P fa (typically when 
6 –9%). This is a minor criticism, though, as rZOD still beats 
very traditional test in 5 of 6 cases. 
The relative performance of the proposed location estima- 
or improves as attack strength decreases, a result that im- 
lies potential new solutions for detecting stealthy network 
ttacks. Thus determination of the “best” proposed estima- 
or becomes a design and application consideration of the end 
ser. Further, this variation in performance between rZOD and 
ZOL imply potential for combination into an ensemble sys- 
em that may provide even higher overall accuracy at lower 
 fa . Ensemble approaches are another item of future work. Two other trends in Table 3 are important to consider. First,
hanging the sample size L improves the performance of the 
roposed tests except VAR. These results are empirically con- 
istent across our analyses to date: Typically, decreasing sam- 
le size only gradually reduces the accuracy of all estimators 
ntil a tipping point is reached, at which the test accuracy rad- 
cally drops. In turn, this reduction in sample size provides a 
aster detection time. We note that our utilized windows are as 
mall or smaller than any other published window sizes in ex- 
sting network anomaly detection work ( Ring et al., 2019 ). This
erformance resilience even at very small windows shows the 
otential utility of these tests in high-speed, low-latency ap- 
lications. 
Second, the results obtained from generated data largely 
einforce the conclusions obtained using collected data, bol- 
tering the repeatability of the results in this work. In both 
ow- and high-volume cases, the relative performance order- 
ng of peer estimators is preserved when using generated data 
e.g., dZOL is the best location estimator, followed by median 
nd then mean). When using generated data, the change in 
erformance of the proposed estimators varies between 0.4 
nd +24.8% at equivalent P d . Additionally, VAR performance 
rops significantly. The causes of these differences have not 
een determined and will be examined as part of future work,
ut these differences also illustrate the large variation in data 
roduced by the generation process and the value of expand- 
ng the analysis in this manner. 
.6. Real-time capability 
e now shift the analysis of results to the subject of compu- 
ational costs, as a useful network anomaly detection system 
ust not only display high accuracy at very low false alarm 
ates ( Axelsson, 2000 ) but must also scale to handle produc- 
ion network data rates while remaining implementable in 
eal time. 
It was previously established that the sample estimation 
ost t est are significantly less than the duration of  (e.g., 3 and
 s) used in our system. By timing individual sub-processes of 
he detection process in Fig. 4 , we can evaluate the constructed 
eal-time potential of the proposed α-stable detection system 
n a high-speed (approximately 1 Gbps) link. 
Table 4 gives the computational cost, in μs unless other- 
ise noted, of each significant detection process step in Fig. 4 .
he results in this table (as well as Table 2 ) were obtained by
veraging individual processes over 10,000 iterations and, as 
uch, are conservative in that they do not implement efficien- 
ies such as multi-core processing or optimized code. To iden- 
ify dependency of the computational cost on sample size,
iming results are given for two values of L commonly used 
uring our analysis of the MAWI traces. 


























































































This scalability analysis considers only the times required
to ingest and process input data files consisting of L counts of
packets per subwindow, as our goal is to achieve a total pro-
cessing time t tot that is significantly less than  . As such, t tot 
includes windowing t win (i.e., processing of a.pcap into sam-
ples), sample ingestion t ing , sample estimation t est , and testing
 det . 
The results in Table 4 show that the proposed test statistics
and methodology should be easily scalable to a real-time en-
vironment. The total detection time t̄ tot is less than a second
and much smaller than  . 
Note that it is likely that t̄ d , equal to the time required to
read, estimate, and measure a sample, is a more appropriate
measure to use when considering scalability. ̄t tot is dominated
by t win (and specifically, file read-write costs) that could be
substantially reduced by streamlining data storage and access
methods as would be done in a commercial implementation. 
These conclusions are explained in more detail in
Appendix B , which contains notes and considerations regard-
ing the timing analysis. Specification of our analysis hardware
is contained in Appendix A . 
5. Conclusions, limitations, and future work 
In this work, we explore the design and resulting performance
of a nonparametric, heavy-tailed statistical network anomaly
detection system. 
5.1. Conclusions 
Non-parametric estimators suitable for heavy-tailed data are
found in the field of ZOS and appropriate tests are derived. The
α-stable assumptions inherent to ZOS are found to be more
faithful to the typical distributions of network traffic; non-
parametric detection also saves on computational costs and
reduces errors incurred by “forcing” a parametric model onto
data. 
The proposed tests are applied to two different, actual vol-
umetric anomalies resulting from DDoS attacks, contained in
real-world traffic collected on a backbone link typically oper-
ating at a rate of 1 Gbps. This proposed system is envisioned
in a commercial implementation as a measurement and alert-
ing layer in an ensemble intrusion prevention system; the pro-
posed estimators would leverage additional layers examining
other features such as IP address to rapidly classify and miti-
gate attacks. 
We find that the proposed implementation, using estima-
tors based on sample location and dispersion, provides the
best overall performance as compared to Gaussian alterna-
tives and the robust statistic of median. In 11 of 12 com-
parisons, the proposed estimators outperform their Gaussian
counterparts, typically by 7–11%, as determined from Monte
Carlo analyses using both collected data and data generated
from ML fits of the collected traffic. The proposed tests also
perform as well as or better than the median in 5 of 6 scenar-
ios (11 of 12 comparisons). 
To explore the scalability of the proposed system, a tim-
ing analysis of key processes is performed. This analysis con-
structively demonstrates the real-time potential of the pro-posed methodology, completing the end-to-end processing
and analysis of 750- and 1200-element, 3- and 6-s traffic sam-
ples in less than 900 ms. In contrast, many proposed network
anomaly detection systems do not demonstrate online op-
eration; using the most rigorous network anomaly detection
survey as a reference, no statistical and less than 12% (8 of
71) of the proposed implementations operated in real time
( Bhuyan et al., 2014 ). 
Overall, the relative performance of these heavy-tailed
methods improves against the lower-volume DDoS attack, im-
plying that the proposed system could enable faster detection
of DDoS attacks as well as more accurate detection of low-
volume, “stealthy” attacks intended to evade traditional de-
tection approaches. Additionally, as the proposed location and
dispersion estimators exhibit differing points of “peak” per-
formance, the combination of their outputs into a multivari-
ate system may enable performance superior to the individual
results presented in this work. 
5.2. Limitations and future work 
Many of the limitations of this work have been noted in the
text. For instance, only two datasets were used, though we
somewhat mitigated this constrained sample size by gener-
ating additional data series using the stable (i.e., heavy-tailed)
parametric fits of benign and attack traffic. 
Additionally, the examined datasets contained only TCP
flooding attacks. The scalability and resilience of the proposed
methodology should be validated through testing against
publicly-available datasets that contain different attacks in a
variety of networks. The performance of the proposed estima-
tors should also be compared to parametric α-stable tests and
recent non- α-stable proposals (e.g., Hosseinzadeh et al. (2020) ).
In terms of commercial applicability, the developed system
only works on a single feature derived from packet captures,
while typical commercial implementations use hundreds of
features and/or flow records. The impacts of aggregated statis-
tics (i.e., netflow records) on the proposed methodology are
unknown, and scaling the application of stable-derived statis-
tics to large feature vectors while providing timely results will
be challenging. 
In closing, we note that because the proposed α-stable es-
timators are nonparametric, the methods described in this
work are, effectively, data-type agnostic. In addition to en-
abling future application to network traffic features other than
packet counts, the nonparametric basis of these estimators
(and ZOS in general) make the techniques in this work appli-
cable to suitably-distributed data from any other field. 
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ppendix A. Computational baseline 
he interested reader should note that the results in this 
ork were obtained using a personal computer running Win- 
ows 7 with 32 GB of installed memory and a 2.6 GHz Intel®
eon TM (E5-2640V3) 8-core processor. The Python 2.6 and MAT- 
AB® r2017a codes used in this research were not optimized 
r coded for parallel computing MATLAB (2017) . The functions 
sed to estimate dZOL and rZOD were coded by the authors. 
Use of commodity hardware and un-optimized code im- 
lies that the methods proposed in this research could be 
caled to link rates much greater than 1 Gbps at substantially- 
educed computational cost. 
All results in this work requiring estimation or creation of 
-stable data were obtained using the ML α-stable fit algo- 
ithm of STABLE®, a proprietary, add-on toolbox in MATLAB®
 Nolan, 2001 ). MATLAB® also offers its own α-stable fitting al- 
orithms; a description of the estimation and generation dif- 
erences between the two algorithms is of interest but beyond 
he scope of this work. 
ppendix B. Timing analysis details 
egarding the times in Tables 2 and 4 , it is important to con-
ider that the scripts for.pcap processing as well as the ZOS 
stimators were coded by the authors and are, as such, un- 
ptimized. Also, note that the time required to actually mea- 
ure and record features on the link and produce an input data 
le is highly dependent upon end-user hardware and imple- 
entation choices. Given that our approach can process the 
nput in a timely manner, the problem of obtaining hardware 
o support actual implementation requirements is delegated 
o the interested user and the time cost of actually capturing 
nd outputting the input.pcap file is not included in our cal- 
ulations. 
The results in Table 4 were obtained by integrating the pro- 
esses of sample ingestion, estimation, and detection were 
nto a MATLAB® timing script. This script was used to mea- 
ure process times over 10,000 sequential runs and determine 
he average detection time t̄ d and average total processing 
ime t̄ tot (which includes the costs of all sub-processes). 
The conclusion that the methods presented in this work 
hould scale to support real-time implementation are rein- 
orced by important considerations regarding the measure- 
ent of t win , which dominates t̄ tot . First, t win was not deter- 
ined from 10,000 trials due to performance issues associated ith un-optimized code; the issues led to significant increases 
n t win as.pcap size increased. Accordingly, t win was instead de- 
ermined by the total time required to ingest the.pcap, count 
eatures, and write the resulting samples using the analyzed 
AWI trace portions. 
Offsetting this limitation, t win (as determined) includes the 
ost to open and read the.pcap file as well as the cost to write
he output file to disk; a streamlined detection implementa- 
ion would use smaller records and avoid the expensive file 
eads and writes. Import of the.pcap file was empirically the 
ostliest sub-process in t win , accounting for nearly half of the 
otal time; as such, we remain confident in our assessment 
hat our methodology supports real-time implementation be- 
ause even our un-optimized implementation can complete 
n end-to-end detection process on 3- and 6-s records in less 
han a second. 
ppendix C. Determination of alarm 
hreshold 
o remain consistent with our nonparametric design ap- 
roach, we calculate the GLRT threshold τ using the Hoeffd- 
ng inequality. This inequality is nonparametric in that it does 
ot rely on distributional assumptions regarding the data 
 Frías-Blanco et al., 2015 ). The Hoeffding inequality has been 
hown to generate more constrained boundaries than alter- 
ative nonparametric approaches relying on the Chebyshev 
r Markov inequalities ( Aggarwal, 2013 ). 
The Hoeffding inequality produces both upper ρu and lower 
l bound estimates based on the upper and lower bounds of 
ata samples d , given by u i and l i , respectively. For random 
rocess Y, comprised of N independent RVs y i , each bounded 
uch that y i ∈ [ l i , u i ] ( Aggarwal, 2013 ), the upper bound is ex-
ressed as 
 ( Y − E [ Y] > ρu ) ≤ exp 
( 
−2 ρ2 u ∑ N 
i =1 ( u i − l i ) 2 
) 
. (15) 
The general definition in (15) requires bounded RVs with 
nite first moments, assumptions that do not apply to α- 
table RVs with α < 1 . Instead of constraining the application 
f (15) to only samples where α > 1 , we can remain consistent
ith a nonparametric approach and recognize that our process 
amples will be finite-valued and possess a finite average. 
This conclusion permits evaluation of (15) , recognizing that 
he upper bound ρu is equivalent to our alarm threshold τ, 
hile the left side of the inequality P (·) is equivalent to our
ystem false-alarm rate χ . 
The system alarm threshold τ is thus expressed as 
= ρu ≤
√ 
ln (χ )(u i − l i ) 2 
−2 , (16) 
or a single sample ( N = 1 ) and d t ∈ [ l i , u i ] . 
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